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Amid Turkey’s heated agenda of constitutional politics during the past few years
(which included a coup attempt, a constitutional referendum, general elections,
mayoral elections with some reruns, and the recent foreign policy crisis) one issue
seems to have received little to no attention: President Erdogan’s repeated call
for reinstating the death penalty. Can Erdogan reinstate the death penalty? No,
simply because he doesn’t have enough political support. But that isn’t the point. The
point is how Erdogan uses the (unfulfillable) constitutional promise to reinstate the
death penalty to consolidate his base. To this end, Erdogan’s use of constitutional
lip service points to and exemplifies an innovative use of constitutions by populist
leaders (and perhaps others too): even when confronted with constitutional barriers
to accomplishing their constitutional goals (e.g., reinstating the death penalty), astute
politicians will distance themselves from those barriers and tell the public that they
would accomplish those goals if it weren’t for the constitution. That, in turn, has the
potential to increase electoral support for populist leaders. This is a double win for
the populist: no actual effort is spent and thus no political and financial resource
exhausted to actually accomplish the constitutional goal, but the political benefits are
still reaped as if the goal were accomplished.
To be sure, though, we don’t know if Erdogan really wants to reinstate the death
penalty. But let’s bracket that question for a moment and focus on what Erdogan
says he wants. The July 2016 coup attempt reignited debates about reintroducing
the death penalty. At a rally held in August 2016 – shortly after the coup attempt –
in his address to a crowd of millions, Erdogan said: “It is the Turkish parliament that
will decide on the death penalty…I declare it in advance, I will approve the decision
made by the parliament.” He further reasoned: “They say there is no death penalty in
the EU… Well, the US has it; Japan has it; China has it; most of the world has it. So
they are allowed to have it. […] Sovereignty belongs to the people, so if the people
make this decision I am sure the political parties will comply.” And ever since 2016,
he has been a vocal supporter of reintroducing the death penalty. In as recent as
March 2019, again during a rally, he repeated his assertion that “if parliament passes
such legislation, [he] will approve it.” In the same speech, in an unusual moment
of self-reflection and criticism, he also said: “We have done wrong by removing the
death penalty. It offends me to feed those in prison, those who martyred 251 of our
citizens, police officers and soldiers on the night of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt,
even though they are serving life sentences.” He went as far as to suggest that New
Zealand, at the time devastated by the Christ Church massacre, should mete out a
fitting punishment to the perpetrator. That arguably positioned Erdogan not only as
an advocate of capital punishment domestically but also internationally (assuming
he had the death penalty in mind when he urged New Zealand to punish the Christ
Church massacre perpetrator “fittingly”).
Erdogan’s invocation of Japan, China, the US, and, to use his own words, “most of
the world”, as comparative authority to legitimate Turkey’s reinstatement of the death
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penalty, fits squarely within an ever-increasing global practice that I term “abusive
comparativism” whereby comparative examples are invoked (often misleadingly) to
legitimate emulating them. But can he and would he emulate countries that retain the
death penalty? My answers to both of these questions are no.
Can Erdogan Reinstate the Death Penalty?
No. Why? Because he doesn’t have the numbers. As already discussed elsewhere,
reinstating the death penalty requires amending the Constitution, specifically Article
38 which expressly outlaws it. Amendment can take two forms: with or without a
referendum. For an amendment to be put to a constitutional referendum, at least
3/5 of the membership (of a total of 600 MPs) needs to agree, that is, 360 MPs at
the very least. The current allocation of seats in the Parliament shows that the AKP
has 291 MPs; its de facto coalition partner, the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (tr.
MHP), has 49. There is also 1 MP from another right-wing nationalist party (tr. BBP)
who we can reasonable assume would vote with the AKP bloc. In sum, the de facto
coalition has a total of 341 members –19 members short of the requisite number
to put the question to a constitutional referendum. (The second form of amending
the constitution directly and without a referendum needs 400 MPs backing up the
proposal, which isn’t a realistic path to pursue and which is why I omit discussing it.)
The question for the political realist is whether Erdogan can garner the support of 19
more MPs. And while the center-right opposition party (tr. IYI Parti) is the most likely
party from whose membership pro-death penalty votes can be secured, given the
political polarization Erdogan has created with his own hands, it is unlikely that votes
from other parties can be “bought” (or “secured”, to put it more politely). Additionally,
even if Erdogan were to secure the approval of a total of 360 members, what would
be the demands of those 19 “defectors” as a price for switching their allegiances?
Would it be too pricy (e.g., a cabinet membership) for Erdogan to accept? And
then there is the question of the political and financial cost of holding yet another
referendum in Turkey where people are in fact tired of having to go to the ballot
box. While popular sentiment, like in many countries, is, on the balance, pro-capital
punishment, putting the question to the ballot box will require serious economic
and political capital investment by the AKP. What is more, the referendum and the
rallying and campaigning that would accompany it could raise the Nationalist Action
Party (Erdogan’s main de facto coalition partner in Parliament and the staunchest
advocate of the death penalty) to a level of domestic prominence that Erdogan
would want to avoid. If the rhetoric of the Nationalist Action Party were even more
populist and appealing to masses than Erdogan’s (“when they go low, we go lower”)
that would be a threat to Erdogan’s already-shaky monopoly over Turkish populist
political discourse.
Would Erdogan Reinstate the Death Penalty?
Let’s assume Erdogan found 19 more votes in Parliament to back up his plan to
amend the Constitution by agreeing to concede certain “benefits” to those 19 votes
(here, I assume that those 19 votes will want something in return, but I may be too
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much of a political realist here – perhaps some would just break with their party lines
and vote merely based on their personal pro-capital punishment convictions). Let’s
assume further that Erdogan assessed the financial and political risks involved in
putting the question to a referendum. Would Erdogan still want to actually go forward
with the referendum?
No. Why? Enter external constraints. Reinstating the death penalty would bring
accession negotiations carried out with the EU to a formal end. I consciously use the
word “formal” because the negotiations can be assumed to be going nowhere as of
now – but that’s still not the same as a formal end to negotiations, which would have
a vast array of symbolic, political, and economic repercussions for Turkey. What is
more, Turkey’s membership in the Council of Europe would be put to substantial risk,
to put it mildly. Foreign investment, already in decline, would continue to diminish,
which would all collectively result in a declining domestic political support for the
AKP, which Erdogan, quite understandably, wishes to avoid at all cost. This final
point is important: to reiterate, Erdogan, I believe, does not actually want to reinstate
the death penalty. Perhaps his sincere personal and even religious (and now I am
just speculating) convictions are such that the death penalty ought to exist as a form
of punishment, but reintroducing it would put Turkey under too much international
pressure that would, in turn, convert to economic pressure that would, in turn, result
in a weakening of his electoral base. And even if only to avoid that from happening,
Erdogan can be assumed to be against actually reinstating the death penalty. (One
important caveat would be a scenario, in which putting the question to a referendum
would result in an increase in popular support for the AKP – currently not the case.
But if somehow that ever happens to be the case, all of the analysis here goes out
the window.)
The Irrelevance of the Death Penalty Debate and
Erdogan’s Double-Win
Should all this comfort us? Sure, knowing that a variety of internal and external
factors constrain Turkey’s political elite from reinstating the death penalty is perhaps
a cause for celebration. But not a very joyous celebration, I must hasten to add.
When we give it some additional thought, especially considering my assertion that
Erdogan actually never wanted to reintroduce the death penalty, a different picture
emerges – one in which Erdogan enjoys a double-win.
By insisting publicly that the death penalty must be reinstated in full awareness that
it would be very difficult to reinstate it as a matter of constitutional law, Erdogan
does two things: First, he connects with the widely-shared ethos of not just his own
voter base, but also with others who perhaps admire him for his “courageous” call
for reinstating the death penalty. Second, and this is the important point, he still
reaps the benefit of having made such a call, even if he can’t actually deliver on it.
Remember Erdogan’s statements at various rallies that I alluded to in the beginning
of the post, in which he repeatedly invokes the Parliament as the constitutional body
to make the decision to reintroduce the death penalty, which he would then approve.
The reference to the Parliament has a dual purpose: it, first and foremost, creates a
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largely misleading façade that portrays the Parliament as an independent decision-
making body, sufficiently insulated from the President (which is emphatically not the
case in present-day Turkey). And second, it also enables Erdogan to play the classic
politician game of “finger-pointing”. Erdogan’s finger-pointing is probably intended to
have listeners (already sympathetic toward reintroducing the death penalty) think in
the following way: it’s the Parliament that isn’t making the decision. It is because of
them, not Erdogan, that Turkey has not been able to reintroduce the death penalty.
If it were only up to Erdogan, he would surely reinstate the death penalty. Ergo,
Erdogan is not to blame for not delivering on his promise.
Simply put, celebrating Erdogan’s “defeat” in not being able to reintroduce the death
penalty ever since 2016 is like celebrating victory in a battle that Erdogan never
actually fought. All he did was deliver constitutional lip service, not actually follow
through (and thus not have to invest political and financial capital in the struggle), but
still excite the masses and consolidate his pro-capital punishment base. If anything,
Erdogan seems to have emerged victorious from a battle he never fought. The
power of constitutional lip service should not be underestimated.
- 4 -
